Israel’s electricity sector is woefully unprepared for the looming threat of regional war
According to senior energy and security officials, Israel is light years away from being adequately prepared for an attack on electricity infrastructure that could come in a full-scale war with Hezbollah or Iran.
Six months have passed since October 7th and the outbreak of Israel’s war in Gaza. And yet, great anxiety is mounting over possible future wars with Iran, or more likely Hezbollah, which could erupt at any moment, and which would lead, among other things, to economic paralysis.
A war scenario with Hezbollah presented last week by the head of the Ministry of Defense’s National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), Brigadier General Yoram Laredo, sparked widespread concern about the level of preparedness for such an event within the energy sector. Despite the fact that state bodies should have been well-prepared long ago for such an event, mudslinging, budgetary problems, and lack of coordination and communication are rampant between various organizations. This bears great significance especially in recent days which have been marked by an unprecedented alertness over the first possible direct military clash with Iran, which has threatened to retaliate for assassinations of senior members of the Revolutionary Guards attributed to Israel.
According to NEMA, in a full-scale war with Hezbollah, about 5,000 rockets, precision missiles, and suicide drones will be launched at Israel every day, targeting critical electricity infrastructure as well. The damage to this infrastructure would lead to two nationwide power outages lasting from 24 to 48 hours, for at least 60% of the country, in addition to 11 regional power outages and numerous local power outages. There would also be power outages lasting weeks and even months in some parts of the country, mainly in the north.
Such a disastrous scenario comes after years of failing to prepare for one of the most significant threats to Israel in the past decade and a half. This is despite the fact that it is well-known that Hezbollah has been strengthening its stockpile of precise and lethal weaponry, and has continued to receive direct, generous, and steady support from Iran. Those who dismissed the threats from the north should have woken up in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine. The Russians launched a systematic attack on power stations and critical electricity infrastructure using Iranian-made suicide drones, primarily Shahed 136. Laredo’s presentation last week included a nighttime satellite image of Europe - the continent illuminated with light, with Ukraine appearing as a vast, dark mass due to the blackout.
Since Russia's attack on Ukraine's electrical facilities, Israeli delegations from the energy sector have visited Kiev several times to learn about the capabilities of Iranian drones and vulnerable points in the electricity networks.
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Yet, it is evident that the lessons of Ukraine have not been absorbed by Israel, with security sources citing the lack of preparedness of the Israel Electric Corporation. In addition to Russia, Iranian weapons are used by their proxy organizations including Hezbollah. Israel's power grids are similar to those of Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, so its weak points have been marked by the enemy. Although no longer a monopoly in the electricity sector, the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) remains a central player, supplying about 40% of the country's electricity production and responsible for its distribution network.
Too little, too late
Calcalist has learned that only at the height of Israel's war with Gaza and amid daily clashes between the IDF and Hezbollah along the Lebanon border, did the IEC begin to step up its readiness for the looming disaster of a full-scale war. Retired Major General Yoel Strick, the former commander of the Northern Command and the Home Front Command who is considered close to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, was asked by the IEC to advise on formulating an updated emergency plan.
Security sources warn that the IEC woke up too late to this potential crisis which could disrupt the entire fabric of life in Israel. Many systems and resources required for such preparedness cannot be immediately obtained. Equipping them requires prolonged planning and procurement processes for numerous replacement parts, including giant transformers, turbines used to operate power plant units, and a huge supply of coal and solar power for electricity generation. With the outbreak of a war in the north, natural gas rigs from the Mediterranean will be completely halted as part of defense measures against direct attacks.
"This is no more dramatic damage that could fall upon citizens than prolonged power outages," a senior security official warned in a conversation with Calcalist. According to him, "the situation is dire. We have no surplus, we have no energy reserves, and there will be a price for it. We are facing an October 7th of life itself, of daily life as we know it." A senior energy official added that there is "deep concern about the level of preparedness of the electricity company for many months, also for Noga (the government-owned Independent System Operator for the electricity industry) which has developed an apocalyptic scenario far more severe than the one presented by the head of NEMA last week."
Without electricity, the central payment clearance system will be paralyzed and credit card transactions will not be possible. Those who want to withdraw cash will find that even ATMs are disconnected. In Israel, there are tens of thousands of patients on ventilators, about 1,000 of whom are in critical condition. With no early preparedness, prolonged disruptions in the power grid will expose them to immediate danger.
Cellular networks will be limited during prolonged power outages. Throughout the country there are about 7,500 cellular sites with backup batteries that allow them to operate for only two hours after a power outage. Just in the past few days, half a year since the beginning of the war, the Ministry of Communications has presented a plan to invest about NIS 40 million ($10.6 million) in energy backup for cellular infrastructures in the north, enabling network stability for 12-24 hours during power outages. According to estimates, the cost of energy backup for all cellular sites across the country is estimated to be about NIS 300 million ($79.7 million).
Last Thursday, during a high alert for missile launches from Iran or their proxies, the IDF initiated widespread GPS disruptions felt in Jerusalem and the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Location-based applications ceased to function, causing confusion among many drivers and disrupting routines. This is just a small indication of what broader disruptions in day-to-day life would look like.
No phones, no warnings
In the absence of electricity, the Israeli public would struggle to receive life-saving instructions from the Home Front Command and emergency authorities. The Home Front Command's siren system requires a constant connection to the power grid. In recent years, applications on smartphones have become primary tools for delivering immediate alerts about missile launches, rockets, and hostile aircrafts. In such a situation, the public would face the reality of hundreds of missiles being launched toward targets in their residential areas without receiving any basic instructions. "The amount of fire will be intense in amounts that we've never experienced. Civilians will be required to take cover, and they won't be able to leave protected spaces or shelters because they won't be able to receive basic instructions," warned a senior security official.
In response to these disastrous scenarios, Meir Spiegler, CEO of the IEC, criticized Lirado last week. He seized the opportunity at the annual conference of the Union of Local Authorities held in Eilat to accuse Laredo of sowing panic: "People create headlines irresponsibly, blowing things out of proportion and spreading panic. It's to protect themselves on the day after. That's not how leaders act," he said.
Minister of Energy and Infrastructures Eli Cohen, who only last January switched positions with his cabinet colleague Israel Katz who entered the Foreign Ministry in his place, joined the attack on Laredo. "To say that there will be power outages over a period of several months is irresponsible. The chance of two days without electricity in about 60% of the country is low."
However, senior figures in the electricity sector and the security establishment are outraged by the attitude in statements from Minister Cohen and Spigler, suggesting that all will be well, and fear that they are undermining the entire state apparatus instead of pushing for improved readiness.
"The message that everything is under control and everything will be fine is terrible. It conveys to all system heads that there are no gaps, as if there aren't patients on life support that need to be prepared for. We feel like the military observers on the Gaza border in the months preceding the Hamas attack; we’re being flooded with warnings, but from their side, 'everything is under control'. This arrogance will be our downfall," said a senior official involved in the matter.
Calcalist has learned that since beginning his tenure as CEO in 2022, Spiegler has never met with Laredo or with the CEO of Noga, Shaul Goldstein. A source in the energy sector defined the level of preparation at the sites of the IEC as “Israel's Achilles heel.” According to him, "without detailing the gaps themselves, the situation is not good. It’s hard to understand why this hasn’t been communicated to the Israeli public until now. At least let them tell \[the public\] the truth and let \[them\] prepare themselves."
Spiegler said in conversation with Calcalist that Laredo’s comments regarding potential power outages harms Israel's national resilience and may cause panic among residents. He says that since the beginning of the war, the IEC has been operating based on a plan which hasn’t received approval from electricity regulators. "If I had waited for approval from regulators, preparation would have happened only after the next war, or the one after that. I took responsibility and made decisions on my own without their approval and without waiting for the bureaucracy."
According to Spiegler, since the start of the war, the IEC has embarked on an extensive procurement of replacement parts and various measures totaling about NIS 700 million ($186 million) "so that we can quickly repair issues and damages to the power grid. We contacted Major General Strick following a missile hit near an IEC team repairing damage near a moshav in the north in mid-November, where one of our employees was killed. We realized that we cannot rely on security forces in the field. Strick will enhance coordination between the electricity company and the IDF and police to strengthen the security of our field teams," he said.
Other energy sector figures expressed doubt about Spiegler’s assessment. They say that in a full-scale war about 90% of the missiles and rockets fired at Israel will be aimed at various targets along the Haifa and northern line, and it’s unclear whether authorization would be granted to work under continuous fire.
Spiegler says that even though he hasn’t personally met with Laredo or Goldshtein, teams from the IEC meet continuously with officials from NEMA and Noga and actively participate in emergency preparedness processes. According to him, a detailed list of replacement parts to restore critical sites that may be affected by missile attacks was made without their approval. "We made the purchases at our own expense, without waiting for them to provide us with budgetary support," he complained.
On the level of preparedness for missile attacks in most of the country, Spiegler told Calcalist that "one doesn’t buy a cow for a cup of milk. Nowhere in the world are preparations always made for the most colossal scenario because no one could survive that economically. If we find ourselves in a situation where our systems are attacked every hour, we will be in another kind of trouble because they will attack other strategic facilities and essential bases of the IDF."
Regarding Russia’s attacks on Ukraine - the emergency model used by NEMA and Noga - Spiegler said that unlike Israel, Ukraine doesn’t have an abundance of replacement parts like those available to the IEC.
Meanwhile, Noga responded that the procurement list submitted by the IEC was partially approved. But, an in-depth study of the list showed that there were purchases made for products that will arrive in Israel only in 2028 and 2029, making it unclear as to which war the IEC is preparing for.